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John G. Leefe* M.L.A.

The Groundfishery in Crisis:
A Personal Snapshot

The collapse of the Atlantic fishery has resulted in significant economic dislocation and is in likelihood, going to result in long-term social dislocation as well. The
unalterable fact is that the fishery of the future is going to be dramatically different
from that which we are now leaving. Hindsight is not valid currency nor is
assessment of blame a worthwhile exercise. We can, if we so choose, learn from
the past. If we select that path our descendants will applaud us. If we choose to
be as blind in the future as we often have been in the past, they will curse us. It
is too earlyyet to define with any degree of certainty what the future fishery should
looklike. Itis timelyhowever, that we should begin to search forthe right questions
as a first step toward securing the right answers. One thing is certain. There is no
going back, only forward.

It has been five years since I left fisheries and much has transpired in the
interval. Atlantic Canada finds itself in a fisheries crisis more complicated than ever before. Stocks, especially northern cod, have declined
dramatically. While declines in other times were assuredly due to natural
phenomena, now it is universally agreed that overfishing is the principle,
though-not necessarily the only, factor in the current crisis.
Canadians for the first time are also facing tremendous competition in
the global marketplace. We in fact are running the real risk of losing our
market share. Capitalization continues to be a problem as does the
hangover from the overcapitalization of the late eighties. It is increasingly
difficult for the industry to secure lines of credit from legitimate lenders,
let alone acquire reasonable operating margins against inventory and
receivables. While interest rates are lower than they have been for almost
two decades, they count for nothing when a frightened lender just says
"no" or, worse, panics and calls in a loan. In fact, about the only thing
which currently favours the industry is the spread between the Canadian
and the American dollars. As has so often been the case in the past, the
Canadian fishing industry is highly dependent on speculation with
respect to the differential between the two currencies. It is a penetrating
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glimpse into the obvious to say that all is not well. Yet when all is said and
done, by far the most important single factor is the availability of fish.
Everything else-everything-flows from that.
There is nothing new about crises in the fishery. The substantial
difference between this and others is that this one is happening to us. Take
for example two 1767 entries in the Diary of Simeon Perkins:
Sunday, Sept. 20th- Schr. Jolly Fisherman arrives from Scatterie with 150
qtls. Went to Newfoundland, thence to Labrador, through the Straits of
Belle Isle, where they heard a new bank was found. Caught no fish. Went
north as far as 54.30... [P]roceeded to the Grand Bank, and got no fish...
came to Scatterie where they caught this lot in four weeks.'
and
Saturday, Nov. 21st-... Liverpool is in poor condition. No fish. Not one
month's provision, and in debt in general more than they can pay. Last
season was exceptionally bad.2
Perkin's diary covers the period 1766-1811 and is replete with
examples of fishery activity. In some instances he complains of poor
catches; in others he speaks of weakened or strong markets; and elsewhere he decries competition from American fishermen. Always there is
the challenge to attract sufficient capital at affordable interest rates from
legitimate lenders. Partnerships among local businessmen were common
fare both to pool modest capital resources and to spread risk.
Most of Perkins' observations and experiences are pertinent to other
Nova Scotians in other times. The constant lies in the fact that the fishery
has remained a staple in the province's economy and that its relative
strength fluctuates, although often for different and unrelated reasons.
The history of the fishery is also replete with efforts by government to
strengthen it through a variety of subsidies and trade barriers. In 1802 the
Nova Scotia Legislature agreed to a bounty of I s per quintal on all sound
and well cured cod for the European and West Indies markets.3 Later in
the decade, barriers were raised against American exports to the West
Indies. This action greatly improved the prospects of selling Nova Scotia
fish in the West Indies market.
The fishery is also the story of fences; fences that didn't work because
those who created them failed to understand that fish don't pay much
attention to fences. For openers, consider the creation of the 200 mile

1. Simeon Perkins, The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1735-1812 (New York: Greenwood Press,
1969) at 31.
2. Ibid. at 35.
3. AnActfor [EIncouragingthe Fisheries[sic]of the Province, by [Girantinga Bounty upon
Cod-Fish [sic], [Claught and [c]ured by the inhabitantsthereof, S.N.S. (at large) 1802 (3rd

Sess.), c.20 .
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fisheries zone in 1977. 4 The assumption was that this would inevitably
lead to secure and indeed strengthened fish stocks. Disregarded were
factors such as continuing pressure on transboundary stocks and new
pressures brought to bear by governments. In the case of the Government
of Canada, it was the issuance of too many new harvesting licences. In the
case of the provinces, it was too great encouragement for expansion of
both the harvesting and processing sectors.
Fences were also erected within the Canadian Zone. In 1982 the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans introduced Sector Management. 5 It
was said that this new management tool would allow groundfish vessels
under 65 feet to be managed within the region with only occasional
reference to Ottawa. That of course never happened because Ottawa
never allowed the local managers to exercise anything other than the most
modest discretion. The essential impact was restriction of vessels under
65 feet to the regions in Which their home ports were located -with the
corresponding loss of mobility and economic viability. As will later be
noted, shrinking fishing areas and the determination to circumvent their
imposition would become a significant factor leading to misreporting of
catches.
Traditionally, Nova Scotia fishermen had been the distant water
sailors of the Canadian fleet. This is clear at least as far back as the 1760's
and is evidenced in the Perkin's entry that puts the Jolly Fisherman in the
vicinity of what we now call Hamilton's Bank. Nova Scotians were
fixtures on the Grand Banks and actively pursued various fisheries in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, including the halibut fishery around Anticosti
Island. George's Bank was on the very doorstep of Nova Scotian
fishermen.
The essential effect of sector management was to drive and restrict the
most active and successful fishing fleet to one of the two most heavily
fished areas along the Atlantic Coast, namely the Scotian Shelf. The
other, of course, is the Grand Bank. Curiously, it seems to have been a
significant revelation to Ottawa when fish stocks on the Scotian Shelf
were found to be under stress. One cannot help but wonder at their
surprise considering the tremendously active nature of the Southwest
Nova Scotian fishery.
Sector Management also had the effect of raising expectations in the
Gulf and Newfoundland regions that more fish would be available and
4. FishingZones of Canada (Zones 1,2 and 3) Order,C.R.C., c. 1547. See also C.R.C., cc.

1548-9.
5. For adescription of the sector management strategy see Resource Allocation in Canadian
FisheriesManagement on the Atlantic Coast by K. Laubstein (Ottawa: Dept. of Fisheries and

Oceans, September, 1987).
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that governments and bankers should make more capital available for
expansion both onshore and offshore-and they did. Sector Management, then, led to greater inefficiencies, more licences, more boats and
plants, more debt, more grants and incentives to expand, and thereby
place correspondingly greater stress on fish stocks.
On October 12, 1984 the World Court at the Hague rendered its
decision on the international boundary across George's Bank. 6 Another
fence sprang up along the Atlantic Coast. On this occasion Canada was
a heavy net beneficiary acquiring only one sixth of the area yet receiving
a disproportionately large share of the resource, including 54% of
scallops, 25% of cod, 38% of haddock, 20% of offshore lobster and most
of the herring. While this new barrier raised expectations of greatly
improved opportunity, it did not resolve the basic dilemma that the fish
are unlikely to pay much attention to the World Court. Stocks could not
be sustained unless both Canada and the United States were prepared to
enter into some form of cooperative if not joint management.7 The
political climate of the day was not conducive to this. Canadians were not
prepared to cave in to the United States, which had, out of a combination
of greed and pique, forced the entire matter to the World Court in the first
place. In fact, in discussions surrounding the founding of the Gulf of
Maine Council in late 1989, the entire matter of the George' s Bank fishery
was so taboo that fish were simply referred to as "the F word".
Fences, although intended to sustain the fishery, have had the net
impact of placing further stress on it. They have created unreasonable
expectations and resulted in increased capitalization, expansion, exploitation, and finally, diminution, if not collapse, of several vitally important
fish stocks. Endeavouring to fence a resource in the wild is a fool's errand
indeed.
Nova Scotia has been consistent in its criticism of fences and especially of Sector Management. While the province welcomed the 200 mile
fisheries zone and the George's Bank decision and more recently amendments to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act' which extend Canadian
control to include straddling stocks even outside Canada's 200 nautical
mile limit, it is recognized that these are not ends in themselves. They are
significant early steps toward managing fish stocks in a prudent and

6. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United
States), [19841 1.C.J. Rep. 246 at 368; 23 I.L.M. 1197.
7. On the need for cooperative or joint management of Eastcoast transboundary stocks see
generally, J. Donaldson & G. Pontecorvo, "Economic Rationalization of Fisheries: The
Problem of Conflicting National Interests on Georges Bank" (1980) 8 O.D.I.L. 149.
8. An Act to Amend the Coastal Fisheries ProtectionAct, S.C. 1994, c.14, amending R.S.
1985, c. C-33.
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rational manner which avoids creating a gold rush mentality in government, communities, and industry.
The province recognized catching immature fish was wide spread and
was certainly to the detriment of the fishery's longterm interests. Unsuccessful efforts were made to have the federal government adopt Atlantic
wide minimum size regulations in 1986. Under the guise of managing fish
as "property" once landed, provincial minimum size regulations were
enacted and enforced.9 Understanding that the explosion of fish plants
associated with the boom of the mid-eighties was detrimental to the
industry, the province in 1988 placed a ban on the issuance of new
processing licences for groundfish.' 0 These policies remain in force.
While these initiatives were important, their impact was muted as a result
of the tremendous over-expansion of the late 70's and early 80's. There
were simply too many vessels chasing fewer and fewer fish within the
narrower and narrower fishing areas created by Sector Management.
The provinces from time to time were given opportunities to comment
on federal fisheries management, especially at the annual fall meeting of
the Atlantic Council of Fisheries Ministers. Here the federal minister
went through the annual ritual of hearing the provinces out and then
largely doing what Department of Fisheries and Oceans staff had intended in the first place. Canada had convinced itself that we had the very
best fisheries management in the world and that it was empirically based
in scientific fact. All fishing effort was measured against FO. 1, which was
said to be roughly 2/3 of the minimum fish mass required to sustain a
given stock. This was the credo for Canadian fish managers. The cloak of
security in which Ottawa wrapped itself was as transparent as the
emperor's new clothes.
American fisheries management was widely reviled as pathetic and
ineffectual in contrast to Canada, yet as the Canadian experience began
to fall apart, certain elements of the American regime came to be viewed
in a more favourable light by Nova Scotia. The conclusion was reached
that while Canada had superior enforcement and fisheries science, the
Americans had a better mousetrap in the way they applied effort controls.
The catharsis which really blew a hole in smooth sailing between Ottawa
and the province was the recognition by Nova Scotia that the statistical
basis for fisheries management was significantly flawed as the result of
widespread misreporting of weights, species, and areas of catch.
A letter was forwarded to then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Tom
Siddon, expressing unequivocally the provincial government's view

9. N.S. Reg. 103/86.
10. N.S. Fisheries Inspection Regulations, O.I.C. 84-1404, N.S. Reg. 286/84.
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with respect to the integrity of federal harvesting statistics. Not surprisingly, this was widely reported in the media. On October 13, 1986 the
Chronicle-Herald reported:
Federal fish quotas are "meaningless" and should be replaced with a new
approach to fish management, Nova Scotia Fisheries Minister John Leefe
said Saturday... "The system is not working and it can't work because the
whole statistical base is fictitious", Leefe said. "Our basic position is that
the entire system of managing quotas is entirely fictitious because, for the
most part, the [catch] statistics on which they are based are not accurate,
and are therefore meaningless"... Leefe slammed the federal government
for sticking with a system that has "disincentives" to reporting catches
accurately. "There has got to be a completely new way of developing a
management regime with incentives to report correctly.""
An article of October 15, 1986 titled "Vast Illegal Fishery Exposed"
reported:
As much as half the fish landed in Nova Scotia is taken illegally in a
massive black market that could net fishermen between $40 and $60
million this year in unreported catches, provincial and industry sources
confirm. Leefe confirmed ... "Industry people, including a lot of fishermen, are telling us the quota is being exceeded by one third to one half".
Allan Billard of the Eastern Fishermen's Federation stated there was
rampant misnaming of species on official DFO reports filled out by
fishermen and processors, underestimating catch weights by fishermen
and wharf-side wheeling and dealing that profited both companies and
fishermen engaging in the trade. Roger Sterling of the Seafood Producers
Association of Nova Scotia observed that if the provincial figures were
accurate, "my main concern would be for the stocks. It would have
implications on the way we've been managing our fish.., if the picture
being painted is true, it makes it look like a farce".12
Needless to say neither Tom Siddon nor senior Department of Fisheries
and Oceans (DFO) staff in Ottawa were amused. The sacred cow had been
gored and the truth was out in the open for all who cared to see.
On December 1, 1986 the Council of Atlantic Fisheries Ministers
convened in Halifax. Siddon opened the meeting noting that there was
widespread concern in Newfoundland with declining inshore catches of
cod. In the Gulf stocks were in decline and in spite of reallocation from
French vessels, there would have to be cuts. Scotia-Fundy would have to
be cut as well. In the final analysis, Newfoundland was cut 7.1%, the Gulf
15.9%, and Scotia-Fundy 9.2%. DFO's aim was to move gradually to
achieving the FO. 1 management level of stocks without imposing abrupt
drastic reductions, while at the same time taking into consideration stock

11. The [Halifax] Chronicle-Herald(13 October 1986) 1.
12. The [Halifax] Chronicle-Herald(17 October 1986) 1.
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assessment and stock biomass. Leefe observed that factors like
misreporting, dumping and discarding needed to be closely applied in
FO. l assessments.
With respect to 2J3KL cod,13 a review of Canadian Atlantic Fisheries
Advisory Committee (CAFSAC) advice indicated that while the stock
biomass had been on the increase, the inshore fishery had been experiencing declining catches. Several factors had been looked at as possible
influences including unfavourable water temperatures in the inshore and
the pattern of offshore fishing effort. The final decision called for a
reduction in the total allowable catch (TAC) for northern cod in 2J3KL
of 10 000 metric tonnes and further that it would all be born by the
offshore fleet. This was particularly detrimental to Nova Scotia as
National Sea Products and several of the Independent Offshore Group
(lOG), including Mersey Seafoods of Liverpool, relied to an important
extent on northern cod from this zone. In the intermittent fish wars
between Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, northern cod loomed large.
Nova Scotian interests, both government and private sector, were never
quite sure whether the federal position was based on politics or good
science. As things turned out, the right answer was given for the right
reasons. What no one realized was just how desperate the situation was
quickly to become.
Understanding the importance of retaining the fishery in Nova Scotian
communities, of maintaining the province's share in a highly competitive
global marketplace and of protecting stocks for the long term, Nova
Scotia put forward a number of initiatives which it believed would
significantly help to achieve these goals. These recommendations were
premised on the need to address questions of misreporting, discarding,
catching small fish, licensing, and the general system of stock assessment
and setting of TACs. The province tenaciously held to the tenet that
adequate catch data was unavailable resulting in entirely inadequate
management decisions. The province put forward the proposition that for
two or three years stocks should be managed with controls on harvesting

13. 213KL refers to a sub area of the Convention Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO) which was established by the Convention on Future Multilateral
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. The Convention was opened for signature on
October 24, 1978 and came into force on October 24, 1978. The Convention Area includes
waters falling under the jurisdiction of Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and the United States,
as well as waters extending beyond the 200 nautical mile limits of these three coastal states.
The convention Area is divided into scientific and statistical sub-areas, divisions and subdivisions, which are used to describe the area of migration of particular stocks of fish. See NAFO
Handbook, (Dartmouth: The Headquarters of NAFO, 1994).
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effort and the protection of juvenile fish. The controls put forward as a
package included:
" continuation of limited entry
" elimination of unutilized licences
" strict enforcement of mesh size regulations
" prohibiting possession of small mesh gear for other than directed
redfish trips
" Atlantic-wide introduction of minimum fish size regulations by
DFO
" enforcement of shelving and icing regulations
* creating incentives for the hook and line fishery including an
experimental allowance for longliners and hand handliners under 65'
" trip limits for mobile gear vessels
" strict enforcement of Section 48 of the Fisheries Act for log book
returns as a condition of licence
" protection of spawning stocks and juvenile fish through temporary
area closures
" no mid-year transfers
" the implementation of bleeding, gutting and icing regulations
" generally, measures to assist the less mobile fleets possibly through
access to fish currently harvested by foreigners such as Soviet
allocations of cod in 3NO.
Typical of DFO, the recommendations were cherry picked and with
the worst of consequences. While the province had agreed to deal with the
matter of "back pocket" dragger licences in return for an allowance for
longliners which would have the effect of not shutting them down, DFO
chose to "freeze" all licences not currently being utilized. That led to a
tremendous firefight between fishermen and Ottawa and between the
province and Ottawa. This resulted in very strained relationships between
the two ministers. Nova Scotia still believes that a singular opportunity
to change fisheries management in Scotia-Fundy in a dramatic, substantial, even radical way was irretrievably lost because Ottawa never really
understood the truve nature of the fishery in the region. A case in point was
the dramatic removal of the universally respected Paul Sutherland as
Director-General, Scotia-Fundy Region, in July 1986. Siddon and his
humourless depu~ty, Peter Meyboom, it was widely rumoured, both
criticized Sutherland for being too close to the industry. Everyone else it
seemed deemed this to be an asset. Sutherland went to Winnipeg and the
situation in Scotia-Fundy went from bad to worse.
In 1987, in an address to the annual meeting of the Fisheries Council
of Canada, the Nova Scotia minister again put forward proposals for
revision of resource allocation and fisheries management. These included:
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" reduction of further capitalization by the provincial government in
the inshore harvesting sector.
* recognition of the tremendously diverse elements in the under 65
foot fleet and establishment of a more equitable distribution of
available resource within it.
" concurrent with the review of the Enterprise Allocation, which then
was underway, instituting a package of management initiatives that
would reflect the legitimate requirements of the multi-licence inshore fishermen, mid-shore groundfish specialists and the offshore.
" acceleration of research, development and management initiatives
which would reduce destructive harvesting including utilization of
larger square mesh otter trawls, selective gear, and minimum limits.
" reducing the degree and complexity of fisheries management-the
1987 season opened January 1 with 8 closure notices already having
been issued with a further 175 having been issued by September.
The provincial minister went on to say that, within the scope of
management policy, the control and reduction of fishing mortality must
be a primary objective.
It is incumbent upon managers in industry and government to reduce the
capture ofjuvenile fish as well as to diminish any incentive to discard. One
way of doing this is to encourage hook and line fisheries, particularly
longlining. It is one of the few initiatives available to managers which will
reduce effort while not reducing the number of fishermen and therefore
must be fully explored. It is within this context that I [Leefe] supported an
inshore hook and line allowance for 1987 and continue to do so in 1988.
By its very nature it is both a selective and a labour intensive fishery. An
allowance program is particularly attractive as a potential and acceptable
means of retiring potential dragger activity in favour of a multi-licence
fleet.
The relationship between Nova Scotia and Ottawa was further poisoned over the issuance of additional offshore lobster licences. The last
meeting of Atlantic Council of Fisheries Ministers attended by the author
was December 14,1988 in Ottawa. It was a most disorganized affair with
the federal minister frequently leaving the chair to attend matters known
to him, but not to his provincial colleagues. Everyone left the meeting
with the sense that DFO had run out of patience with its provincial critics.
The author's final observation was a bitter one. So much effort had been
expended preparing for the meeting and so little attention was paid by the
federal minister who chose to leave early in order to attend a luncheon.
During the five years the author served as Minister of Fisheries for
Nova Scotia, the province concentrated largely on matters falling within
its constitutional responsibilities. There were occasions, however, when
provincial responsibilities had an impact on harvesting. In the late 1980's
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the Fisheries Loan Board adjusted its policies disallowing loans for new
draggers, although replacement vessels were eligible. The Board also
refused to provide loans for combined licences and for construction of socalled "jumbo 44's". The intention was to lend encouragement to
longliners, not to draggers.
In March 1989 the province put a moratorium on the issuance of
groundfish processing plant licences and groundfish buyers licences.
This was in recognition that the resource was becoming sufficiently
stressed that plants and buyers of long standing were going to face an
uncertain future and that increased competition would serve no party
well. To date the only new licences issued by the province are for fish
other than groundfish and for unutilized and underutilized species.
In 1989 Siddon established the Hach6 Task Force, a one man inquiry
headed by Assistant Deputy Minister Atlantic Jean Eude Hachr. The
purpose of the exercise was to create a new management regime on the
basis of recommendations made by interested people across Atlantic
Canada. The author made a submission and when the Hach6 Report 4 was
complete and public, praised it as a sound document. There was certainly
some satisfaction for Nova Scotians as fully two-thirds of the recommendations reflected those made through the years by industry and provincial
fisheries. The emphasis was on longlining and the need to make it more
attractive; on putting an end to dumping, high-grading and fishing by
"shopping lists"; on the introduction of mandatory observers in the
Canadian offshore; on the use of mandatory square mesh nets; and on the
banning of net liners. It was refreshing in its emphasis on managing by
effort control, closures and trip limits with mixed species total catches
instead of fishing entirely to mythological numbers created by what, at
best, is a most imperfect science. Sadly, the recommendations were too
late; the decline in stocks had passed from serious to critical. In any event
this report too went the way of so many others, consigned to an Ottawa
shelf to gather dust. It is the view of many in the industry today, that if the
recommendations of the Hach6 Report had been implemented immediately, the currently prevailing situation in Southwest Nova Scotia might
well have been averted. The rest, as they say, is history.
It is possible, however, to close on a positive, perhaps even optimistic,
note. In its 1993 Conservation Requirements Report to Minister of
Fisheries, John Crosby, the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council
(FRCC) spoke, however timidly, to the matter of effort control.

14. Canada, Report of the Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Task Force (Ottawa: Dept. of Fisheries
and Oceans, 1989) (Ctiair: J.E. Hach6).
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It is obvious to everyone that the current harvesting capacity and resulting
huge amount of fishing effort cannot be sustained-even if stocks could
be miraculously rebuilt to somewhere in the range of historical averages.15
and further
Unless this [controlling effort] the practices of misreporting, high-grading
and dumping and the continuing pressure for a greater supply of fish than
the resource can sustain will be sufficient to jeopardize the success or even
the best intentioned conservation plans.' 6

Encouragingly, the FRCC recommendations for 1995 not only further
underscore the importance of controlling effort, they also re-enforce the
necessity of managing by the "ecological" approach. 7 Perhaps progress
is beginning to be made after all.
Afterward
Traditionally, Nova Scotia has argued that there are legitimate places for
the inshore, midshore, and offshore fleets. The province has also consistently stated that the marketplace, not government, should determine
which processing plants are viable and which are not. Unlike other
provinces, Nova Scotia has argued that Canadian fisheries management
has been substantially flawed both in its statistical base and in the
substance of management application. Nova Scotia has consistently
argued against trying to manage by constructing fences around a wild
resource. Nova Scotia has also consistently argued in favour of
Canadianizing the fishery and, further, that the resource is a Canadian not
a provincial resource. All argument aside, what is to be done with respect
to rejuvenating a clearly depleted groundfish resource?
Clearly, we must come to understand and respond to the fact that the
ocean and the relationships between its lifeforms and their environment
are incredibly complex and that we cannot therefore manage fish stocks
in isolation from each other and from their environment. In other words,
ocean resources must be managed holistically.
Rather than trying to restrict harvesting by virtue of place of residence
(read Sector Management), restriction should be based on controlling
effort. For example, there is a strong rationale for restricting the inshore
and midshore groundfish fisheries in 4VW and in the Gulf to hook and
line as well as for stringently restricting activity by vessels with offshore

15. Canada, 1993 ConservationRequirementsforAtlantic Groundfish:Report to the Minister of Fisheriesand Oceans (Ottawa: The Council, 1993) (Minister: John Crosbie) at 11.
16. Ibid.
17. Canada, 1995 Conservation Requirements for Atlantic Groundfish: Report to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (Ottawa: The Council, 1994) at 2.
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capability in these areas. Also, there must be simple instruments made
available to managers in the regions to close and open areas where
spawners and large congregations of juveniles are found. Penalties for
discarding, dumping, highgrading, fishing to fill shopping lists, and other
such destructive practices must be sufficiently severe that they serve as
disincentives for cheating. Governments must find incentives which will
attract fishermen to the most selective and, therefore, the least destructive
fisheries wherever possible.
Governments must commit significant financial resources to coordinated and practical scientific fisheries research. Integral to this must be
the inclusion of the harvesting sector itself so that it is a partner in the
process and so it will be able to buy into decisions taken on the basis of
good science. Additionally, monies must be invested in understanding
fisheries technology and its impact on the resource and in working with
the private sector to develop sound technology. Tax incentives should be
made available to the private sector to partner and indeed pioneer in both
research and development. The university and scientific communities
must be given every encouragement to link directly with the fishing
community to create better science for better ocean management and
therefore better bottom lines and better longterm prospectives. Internationally, governments must band together to create joint management
regimes for transboundary stocks on the understanding that fish move
about with little attention paid to human-made boundaries. A good start
might well be an international commission to manage George's Bank and
the Gulf of Maine.
It has often been observed that difficult decisions about the fishery
only get made in difficult times. If that is the case, then what better time
to strike! The purpose and implementation of The Atlantic Groundfish
Strategy (TAGS) must be clear and unequivocal and must be designed to
eliminate the weakest and the least desirable practices. Harvesting
Adjustment Boards must work not only quantitatively, but qualitatively.
They should create incentives to attract those whose groundfishing
methodology is least selective into retirement as well as incentives for the
retirement of personal and vessel fishing licences. A part of this strategy
should apply to the offshore as well. The boards should have the power
to buy dragger and gillnet licences while leaving those who wish to
continue in the fishery the option to do so with more selective and less
destructive technologies.
Also, government should revisit the Romeo LeBlanc policy of curtailing vertical integration. This prohibition has been applied to processors,
but has not been applied to harvesters. A significant result has been
vertical integration initiated by fishermen who have become very aggres-
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sive fishermen/processors. It has also resulted in the backdoor purchase
by processors of many vessels under 45 foot in order to provide them with
some reasonable security of supply.
The offshore fleet is often thought to comprise only National Sea
Products. In fact, the Offshore Vessel Owners Working Group also
includes Fisheries Products International and Seafreeze. The Independent Offshore Group (lOG) has 6 Nova Scotia companies operating in it,
namely MV Osprey, Usen, Clearwater, Karlsen, Ocean Fresh, and
Mersey Seafoods. These companies, both large and small, have shown
capacity for surmounting extremely difficult odds. In the case of wetfish
trawlers, they have either been tied up or are employed in other than the
groundfishery. Freezer trawler technology has allowed others to redefine
fishing effort and concentrate on shrimp and less stressed species which
fall under the general headings of underutilized and unutilized. Nova
Scotia companies in particular have demonstrated capacity for sourcing
product outside Canada, thereby protecting investors and the communities and workers in which the fish is processed. This has also made it
possible for these companies to retain customer loyalty and, therefore, a
substantial marketshare in a vigorously sharp and competitive marketplace.
Undoubtedly the most difficult decision of all will be whether governments run the fishery as a subsistence social programme or step back and
allow it to develop as a viable world class business which, by its very
nature, is a creator of new wealth sustained by striving to secure healthy
fish stocks. The natural resource sector cannot sustain Canada in the new
economy as it did in the industrial age, which we are rapidly putting
behind us. It surely will have its place, but that place will be far less
prominent and provide far fewer jobs no matter how many King Luds
may militate otherwise.
Finally, it may be said that if the arguments put forward by Nova Scotia
for new approaches to management had been adopted in the mid-eighties,
the situation in Scotia-Fundy might be measurably better than is currently
the case. The situation in 4X and 5 might well have stabilized and there
might be an inshore hook and line fishery in 4VW. The "might have
beens" of history, while interesting to ponder are, however, of no
consequence. We are where we are, the best we can hope to do is learn
from the past and apply those lessons to public policy and industry
initiatives to create a sustainable resource and, in the full meaning of the
Bruntland definition, a sustainable economy. All of this must be accomplished within the constitutional 8 law separating provincial and federal
18.

ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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responsibilities, thereby ensuring to the national government the right
and the responsibility to be the honest broker, or at least as honest as any
broker can be seen to be, respecting sharing of the common property
resource we call fish.
When I first went to Nova Scotia Fisheries, the late D.A. Sandy
MacLean who then was Deputy Minister recommended that I read a book
entitled Distant Waters.1 9 As was his custom he gave good advice. The
general tenor of the book presaged the difficulties faced today by those
who, in time of apparent greater abundance, prosecuted distant water
fisheries in the North Atlantic. I think it may also have been Sandy
MacLean who reminded me of Joseph Conrad's observation in Typhoon.
It is an appropriate note on which to stand and look to the future, a future
in which we can choose to have a determining, but not definitive hand:
The sea never changes and its works, for all the talk of men, are wrapped
in mystery.

19. Warner, William W. Distant Water: The Fate of the North Atlantic Fisherman (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1983)
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